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Abstract 
One of the central questions facing the regulatory and competition authorities is whether to 
delegate the regulation of the potentially competitive elements of the utility to specialised 
regulatory agencies, or whether they should be solely subject to normal competition laws 
enforced by the competition authorities – often referred to as ‘light-handed regulation’.  
German electricity and New Zealand utilities exemplify this approach, with the United States 
at the other extreme in granting considerable powers to federal regulatory agencies. Britain 
evolved a system of licensing the majority of network activities, including the larger part of 
the potentially competitive services such as electricity generation and supply, gas trading and 
supply, and mobile telephony. The EU, in contrast, has always placed more emphasis on the 
application of competition law, and has sought to make sector regulation consistent with 
general competition law. This is most clearly evident in the 2003 EU Communications 
Directives which required considerable changes on the British approach to telecoms 
regulation. 
The paper discusses the appropriateness of this approach for telecoms and electricity. 
Post-modern utilities like telecoms, in which facilities-based competition is possible, lend 
themselves to the approach laid out in the Communications Directives. Regulators must first 
determine whether markets are effectively competitive or suffer from Significant Market 
Power (SMP). Only in the latter case is ex ante regulation warranted, and then only if it is 
necessary, justified and proportionate. The paper considers how this approach works in the 
case of mobile call termination, and the implications of restricting regulation solely to the 
market experiencing SMP. 
Electricity does not fit comfortably into this approach, in part because the wholesale 
market is more likely to suffer from collective dominance than the single firm dominance that 
allows for an easier determination of SMP. Licence conditions are no longer needed under 
the Telecommunications Directives, but appear to retain advantages for electricity, where 
information and continuing market surveillance are desirable, and where it may be necessary 
to modify market rules in a timely and well-informed manner. The paper considers the 
example of the English Electricity Pool, which suffered from tacit collusion in the period 
1996-99, and the unsuccessful attempts of the regulator to impose a Market Abuse Licence 
Condition.  
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Introduction 
The deregulation movement that started in the United States was intended to remove detailed 
government control from otherwise competitive markets. The theory of regulatory capture 
expounded by Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) argued that most industrial regulation was 
designed to protect incumbents against competition from entrants and had the effect of 
legalising monopoly power to the detriment of consumer welfare. Transport deregulation 
followed, most notably after Alfred Kahn's move to the Federal Aviation Administration and 
the subsequent deregulation of airlines. Normal competition policy would replace the detailed 
regulatory control exercised by state-level and federal regulators.  
 It is hard to see why naturally competitive industries like trucking should ever be 
subject to economic regulation, given that trucks meet the required safety and environmental 
standards. Similarly, the theory of contestability suggests that mobile assets like aeroplanes 
do not need to be protected against competition nor regulated to prevent excessive prices. In 
short, where competitive markets can work, they should not be subject to economic 
regulation, but only to normal competition law.  
 The situation is radically different for network utilities, where the network is typically 
a natural monopoly, delivering essential services to the mass of the voting consumer 
population. Electricity grids, gas distribution networks, local telephone networks, water and 
railways all share this property. Modern societies will not tolerate the unimpeded exercise of 
market power over such essential facilities. Network builders typically need rights to build 
networks, and local or national jurisdictions will only grant such rights in exchange for 
regulatory powers over prices and quality. Private investors will be reluctant to sink 
expensive capital investments without some assurance that they will not subsequently be 
prevented from charging remunerative prices. The only solution under private ownership is 
regulation. If such regulation is not credible, adequate investment will not be forthcoming 
and state or municipal supply will be the only viable default option.  
 Cost-of-service (or rate-of-return) regulation evolved in the United States over nearly 
two centuries in response to legal challenges to clarify the nature of property rights and place 
restraints on regulatory activism. When Britain came to privatise British Telecommunications 
(BT) in 1984, it was recognised that BT would have overwhelming market power in local 
telephone services, and for a considerable period very substantial market power in long-
distance telephony. Regulation was clearly required, and Professor Littlechild was 
commissioned to propose a suitable form of regulation. Littlechild designed price-cap 
regulation as the natural solution to moving from an overwhelmingly concentrated market to 
what was anticipated to become a competitive telecommunications market in due course 
(Littlechild, 1983; Bartle, 2003). Price-cap regulation has the attractive property of simulating 
the competitive market even in the presence of market power.  
 In the United States, the Modified Final Judgement of the AT&T case in 1984 
suggested that at least long-distance telephony might evolve to become a competitive 
industry. Long-distance telephony was no longer a natural monopoly with the advent of 
microwave transmission, the huge increase in capacity provided by fibre optic cables and the 
rapid fall in the cost of micro-electronics and switching capacity. This raised the question 
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why telecoms should be subject to a sector-specific regulator, rather than being subject to 
normal competition law. Instead of imposing a price-cap, competition authorities could fine 
companies holding dominant positions in any market if they abused their market power by 
charging excessively high prices. The threat of penalties would, on this theory, deter utilities 
from exercising their market power, while minimising intrusive and costly regulation. 
 The case for minimising regulation is powerful. The US evidence suggests that 
regulation evolves in response to pressures from special interest groups. On this view 
regulators are invariably captured, and use their regulatory powers to redistribute rents rather 
than to drive down costs and benefit consumers. The theory of asymmetric information 
suggests that just as redistributive taxation is distortionary and therefore costly, so attempts to 
redistribute cost savings from utilities to consumers will produce inefficiencies and dead-
weight loss. Regulatory inefficiency does not end with overpricing or inefficient supply. 
Hausman (1997) argues that one of the most costly consequences of traditional cost-of-service 
regulation is the delay hindering the introduction of new services, caused by concern that these 
new services might be cross-subsidised from the captive customer base. Hausman gives two 
examples - voice messaging and cellar phones. AT&T originally wished to offer voice 
messaging in the late 1970s, which the FCC delayed until 1988, when it was immediately 
introduced.  The estimated consumer surplus generated is estimated at US$1.27 billion per year 
by 1994, so the ten-year regulatory delay cost billions of dollars. Hausman further argues that a 
possible ten-year regulatory delay in introducing mobile phones might have cost consumers 
cumulatively as much as $100 billion, large compared with the 1995 US global telecoms 
revenues of $180 billion/year. 
 Avoiding unnecessary regulation is therefore to be desired. New Zealand was the first 
country to follow this logic when it came to liberalise its telecommunications market on 1 
April 1989 (Bollard and Pickford, 1996). The state telephone monopoly that had been 
corporatised as Telecom in 1987, was sold in 1990 to a joint venture between local investors 
and the two American companies, Bell Atlantic and Ameritech, without establishing an 
independent regulatory body. The company was required to disclose financial and pricing 
information, and the “Kiwi share” obligation required Telecom to provide free local calls for 
residential customers and to not increase the (uniform country-wide) rental charge faster than 
the rate of inflation. It also provided an undertaking to ensure that interconnection would be 
provided to competitors on a “fair and reasonable basis”.  
Clear Communications negotiated a long-distance access agreement with Telecom 
and entered the market in April 1991. By 1995, Clear had 21% of the domestic long-distance 
market and 24% of the international calls market. Shortly afterwards, Clear attempted to 
reach an agreement to access Telecom's local loops in order to be able to provide a local call 
service, but negotiations broke down. The matter at issue was whether Telecom could set the 
access charge using the Efficient Component Pricing Rule of Baumol (1983) and Willig 
(1979), which included the lost profit of Telecom, or whether, as Clear argued, the access 
price should be based on avoidable cost. Clear took Telecom to court for  claimed abuse of its 
dominant position. The High Court supported Telecom's application of the Baumol-Willig 
rule but found that Telecom had indeed impeded entry. Both companies appealed and in 
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December 1993 the Court of Appeal upheld the dominance finding but found against the 
Baumol-Willig rule. The case was finally appealed to the Privy Council in Britain, who 
accepted the original High Court judgement and supported the Baumol-Willig rule. Their 
argument was that if the monopoly price element (Telecom’s lost profit from each call carried 
by Clear) was objectionable, then it was open to the government to control those monopoly 
profits directly under the provisions of the Commerce Act.  
The case is justly famous, both because it illuminated the economic principals of the 
efficient component pricing rule, and because it demonstrated the major drawback of relying 
on competition law, namely the time and cost involved in resolving disputes. The case started 
in 1991 and the government did not resolve the issue until July 1995. In 2001 the government 
passed a Telecommunications Act which obliges the Commerce Commission to resolve 
access disputes, to monitor the regulatory regime, and to recommend changes to the list of 
regulated services. It was not until April 2003 that the Commerce Commission, acting under 
the requirement of the Telecommunications Act, published an issues paper consulting on 
whether access to the local loop should be regulated.2 New Zealand appears to be following 
an evolutionary path in clarifying the role of regulatory agencies, starting from a minimalist 
position, but responding to the need to resolve disputes quickly and to restrain market power 
more effectively than appears possible under the normal provisions of competition law. 
There are similar lessons to learn from the early experience of telecoms regulation in 
the UK. When BT was privatised in 1984, it faced a single small licensed rival, Mercury, that 
was granted protection against entry until at least 1991. Although BT's services to final 
customers were subject to price-cap regulation, access agreements between BT and Mercury 
were left to commercial negotiation. Mercury, like Clear in New Zealand, immediately 
disputed the terms offered by BT and appealed to OFTEL, the telecoms regulator. 
Economists rapidly established that interconnection agreements between symmetric network 
operators, each of which had sole ability to terminate calls to its subscribers, would lead to 
agreements that were at or above the profit-maximising level. The fact that both operators 
might speedily agree access charges was no guarantee that these charges would be in the 
public interest. Fortunately, access agreements between very asymmetric players might break 
down as the dominant player attempted to exclude his competitor, and in such cases disputes 
would come to light, as with Clear and Mercury. Since then, the theory of access pricing has 
been developed (Armstrong, 1996, 1998; Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a, 1998b) so that 
interconnection is now recognised to be an area of regulatory scrutiny, if not regulatory 
control.  
 
Implicit versus explicit regulation of natural monopolies 
New Zealand and Germany lacked regulators for at least some network monopolies until 
recently.3 In effect, the network owners were subject to implicit rather than explicit 
                                                 
2  See Network, Issue 14, August 2003, published by the ACCC, Melbourne, Australia 
3  At the date of the conference, Germany still awaited the final passage of the relevant legislation 
setting up an electricity regulator, but this was anticipated by July 2005. 
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regulation – they could pursue profits providing they did not violate competition legislation, 
and specifically did not abuse their dominant position. This raises the question whether there 
are important differences between implicit and explicit regulation, and whether in particular 
there are additional advantages to implicit regulation (apart from avoiding the drawbacks of 
regulation already noted). Utilities might argue that any action that does not breach the rules 
of explicit regulation is legitimate. Poorly designed or incomplete regulation (for example, 
failing to address issues of quality) may then lead to unsatisfactory outcomes. Utilities might 
believe that the concept of abusing dominance was more encompassing and could include 
any outcome that damaged consumers compared to the counterfactual of a competitively 
supplied service, where consumers could choose according to quality and price. In that case 
implicit regulation might seem to have advantages. 
 The question is interesting but hard to answer. Poor regulation can normally be 
improved, although in some jurisdictions this might require new legislation that would be 
very hard to pass.4 On the other hand, utilities might argue that abusing dominance was 
narrowly interpreted as unreasonable high pricing or unjustified discrimination. If there is no 
case law on other aspects, such as supplying unsatisfactory quality, then it might be hard to 
address such problems. There is a further and important point demonstrated in Germany. The 
justified (average) price for using a network will be the average cost, including a normal 
return on, and depreciation of, the capital. Valuing the capital in the network is therefore 
central to network regulation, and has been highly contentious in Britain (Newbery, 1997). 
The problem is whether to value the assets at historic cost, the privatisation sales value, or at 
written-down modern equivalent asset value (to take the most obvious alternatives). The 
differences can be profound: for water the sales value was £6 billion but the written down 
modern equivalent asset value was estimated at more than £100 billion.  
In Britain, decisions by the regulator are typically appealed to and settled by the 
Competition Commission, thereby gradually building up suitable precedents. Without that 
process and the consequential development of case law, the courts examining whether prices 
were defensible or not might reach economically unsatisfactory conclusions, or might, 
particularly if the same competition authorities were involved as in regulatory dispute 
resolution, reach the same conclusions, but far more slowly and expensively.  
 
The evolution of liberalisation towards structural reform 
Telecommunications was the first network utility to be privatised in the UK, and the first to 
be liberalised in the United States, in both cases for good reason. The underlying case for 
liberalising network industries is that it allows competitive pressure to be put on sleepy 
monopolies, and restricts cross-subsidies that frequently take the form of a tax on competitive 
medium-sized industry to subsidise domestic consumers (and sometimes politically powerful 
large business). In the case of telecoms, where technical progress is rapid, competition is the best 
way of identifying winners and enabling them to replace losers. It is also easier to sustain 
                                                 
4 Chile is a notable example, see Bitran and Serra, (1998), Heller and McCubbins, (1996) 
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telecoms as a private regulated utility than with most other utilities, as there is less difficulty in 
designing a system of regulation that will be credible and therefore sustainable.  
While the United States had strong Constitutional protection of regulated utilities, 
reinforced by extensive case law and underpinned by Administrative Law (Levy and Spiller, 
1996), Britain had a sovereign Parliament that was free to change laws, and hence to threaten the 
stability of any legal arrangements. The essence of credible regulation is that the private investor 
should have confidence that his sunk investment will not be subject to regulatory opportunism, 
by, for example, reducing regulated prices to non-remunerative levels. The temptation to act 
opportunistically is counterbalanced by the threat of the utility to not invest if it finds the 
regulatory compact has been broken (Gilbert and Newbery, 1996; Newbery, 2000). In the case 
of telecoms, the rate of growth of demand is high, the need for investment in new technology 
continuous, and the expertise of the telecoms company in managing the software and equipment 
critical. All these factors give the utility strong bargaining power in the repeated game between 
regulator and utility. 
Telecoms industries are, however, atypical of other network utilities, in that liberalisation 
normally retains the initial industrial structure, with entry taking place by competing networks 
that require interconnection. The United States was relatively unusual in that AT&T agreed to its 
own break-up into Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) and the long-distance AT&T, 
reflecting the earlier functional organisation of the company and the vast size of the United 
States (Temin, 1987). BT was allowed to retain its local exchanges with their local loops as well 
as its long-distance network and international lines; a model followed in most modest-sized 
countries. Even in the United States, competition took place between different interstate 
networks, each of which had to interconnect with an RBOC. In that sense, long-distance 
networks had ceased to be natural monopolies, although they continued to be regulated by the 
FCC. 
 The quest for increased competition in the United States led to the gradual restructuring 
of regulation in the privately owned but regulated natural gas industry. The gas industry 
appeared ideally suited to competition, with over 8,000 producers, the 40 largest of which 
accounted for 57% of 1990 gas production.  They were connected to more than 1600 Local 
Distribution Companies through 44 major interstate pipeline systems and hundreds of smaller 
pipeline companies (IEA, 1994). Despite the obvious prospect of competition in supply, well-
head gas prices were regulated, creating huge inefficiencies after the oil price rises of the 1970s. 
The subsequent collapse of the market as long-term contracts were signed at the peak of the oil 
price boom created excess capacity in pipeline networks, ideal conditions for the introduction of 
competition (IEA, 1994). Various Federal Energy Regulatory Commission orders from 1984 on 
finally unbundled and restructured the industry to one of third party access that facilitated active 
competition.  
 As with the privatisation of BT, Britain was slow to learn the importance of 
competition for enhancing performance, and thus also slow to realise the importance of 
restructuring utilities to achieve effective competition. In the case of BT, the legislation had 
at least envisaged a review of the duopoly in 1991. The Duopoly Review recommended full 
liberalisation of entry, which duly occurred. By 1995 there were over 150 operators licensed to 
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compete with BT, including 125 cable TV companies who could offer telephony with cable, of 
which 80 were actually providing service, (Bell, 1995). Rapid entry was followed by substantial 
consolidation, but cable companies now have more than half the broadband market. The failure 
to create a more competitive structure at privatisation and the delay in allowing competition led 
Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers (1994) to the judgement that ‘the duopoly policy has been 
detrimental to development of competition, and its main beneficiary has been BT itself’ (p.240).  
 Unfortunately, the American liberalisation experience (in both gas and telecoms) was 
not exploited when British Gas was privatised as a vertically integrated monopoly in 1986, 
although Vickers and Yarrow (1988, p267) criticised the failure to introduce competition. Under 
intense regulatory pressure, supported by the Office of Fair Trading and via references to the 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission, British Gas was persuaded to first functionally unbundle 
the competitive services from the natural monopoly networks, and then finally to break up the 
company into competitive and monopoly parts. The latter, Transco, in turn sold off storage 
activities and finally merged with the already unbundled electricity National Grid Company, 
consolidating the regulated energy networks in one company. Even here, regulatory activism has 
attempted to replace regulated prices by market mechanisms of auctions, first for storage, and 
then for scarce entry capacity from the beach-head (to which gas is delivered by various oil and 
gas companies using their own pipelines). Fortunately, by the time the electricity supply industry 
(ESI) came to be privatised in 1990, the message of restructuring to introduce competition 
before privatisation had finally been learned. 
 
Unbundling the competitive services 
The new conventional wisdom is that network utilities should be unbundled, with the potentially 
competitive network services under separate ownership from the natural monopoly network, so 
that the network owner has no incentive to favour its own service provider. Such vertical 
separation of network service from the network risks losing economies of scope and hence 
raising costs. In the case of electricity and gas, these economies of scope appear small compared 
to the potential efficiency gains, but in the case of telecoms this is less obvious. The operator of 
a switched network has to create end-to-end connectivity and at the same time calculate the 
cost of the call in order to bill the customer. The design of switches to route and record such 
information have natural synergies that would take considerable investment and design to 
replicate at comparable cost in unbundled form. In those parts of the network where 
economies of scale are not significant (long-distance, international) facilities-based 
competition is feasible and now fairly standard, but where there are important natural 
monopolies (arguably still in the local loop), vertical integration between call delivery, billing 
and network ownership is still common. Positive steps to overcome the advantages of 
incumbency are then required (such as number portability and carrier pre-selection). 
The attraction of ownership unbundling is two-fold - it allows competition to give 
companies better incentives to drive down costs, and it also offers the prospect of removing 
costly regulation. The new wisdom of “competition where feasible, regulation where not” 
suggests that regulation should be confined to the natural monopoly elements, typically the 
networks, with network services subject only to competition law. Indeed, in transcribing the EU 
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Electricity Directive 96/92 into national legislation, some Continental countries adopted this 
approach. Britain followed an earlier and different path. The difficulty of creating credible 
regulatory structures through primary legislation led the designers to propose licences that would 
contain the important regulatory details. These licences had the force of contracts, enforceable 
through the courts. They could only be changed by mutual agreement between the utility and the 
regulator, or if the regulator found that continuing the existing licence conditions unchanged 
would be against the public interest (normally at the periodic price control review). The 
regulator could then propose a licence modification (normally a change in the level of the price 
cap for the start of the next regulatory period, and/or a change in the X-factor in the RPI-X 
formula). This could either be accepted or appealed to the Competition Commission – an 
alternative costly to both utility and regulator, and hence to be avoided if possible. 
Licences were clearly central to the British style of price-cap regulation of the network 
natural monopolies, but were also retained for the potentially competitive network services. 
Their licence conditions typically contained rules of market behaviour, and provided for 
information disclosure to the regulator, who was thus able to exercise a market surveillance role. 
The position now is that, after the New Zealand experience, it is widely accepted that ex ante 
regulation is required for network natural monopolies, but there is less agreement whether such 
regulation is required for network services, or under what circumstances and in what form such 
regulation might be desirable. 
 
Regulating network services 
Regulatory design in Britain, the United States and in the EU has followed quite different 
routes. In the United States, utilities were already for the most part investor owned and 
regulated as vertically integrated franchise monopolies, under existing legislation. To take a 
good example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, FERC, has extensive powers 
under the 1935 Federal Power Act. Individual States have devolved regulatory powers, but 
FERC has a statutory obligation to ensure that wholesale prices are “just and reasonable”. This 
gives FERC considerable powers to intervene if liberalisation fails to deliver satisfactory 
outcomes. Britain, as already noted, had to design a system of regulation at short notice and 
evolved a system of licences. Where the industry was liberalised or restructured, the major 
companies were typically required to hold licences. On the Continent, competitive services were 
frequently subject only to normal competition legislation. The Single European Act mandated 
the European Commission to propose policies to bring about a single market in gas, electricity, 
transport and telecommunications. The Commission has been remarkably successful in issuing 
Directives with that intent, and is following a strategy that builds on existing articles of the 
Treaty of Rome and therefore already have been incorporated into each member state’s 
legislation.  
 
Applications to regulating telecommunications 
The four EC Communications Directives that came into force on 24 April 2002 are an 
instructive example of how this process works for delivering a single market in 
telecommunications operating under a consistent regulatory framework. The Commission 
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Guidelines on market analysis explains how they will work (CEC, 2002). The new regulatory 
framework requires that “the markets to be regulated are defined in accordance with the 
principles of European competition law.” (Guidelines, para 4). Later on it notes that “to ensure 
consistency, these guidelines are based on (1) existing case-law of the European Court of Justice 
concerning market definition and the notion of dominant position within the meaning of Article 
82 of the EC Treaty and Article 2 of the merger control Regulation; …” (para 24).   
 The four directives are the Framework Directive, the Access and Interconnection 
Directive, the Authorisation Directive, and the Universal Service Directive, which member 
states are required to implement from 25 July 2003. The Framework Directive requires 
National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) to conduct market reviews and to determine which 
markets shall be deemed to be effectively competitive, and which markets are susceptible to 
ex ante regulation. A market is effectively competitive when no operator in that market 
possess Significant Market Power (SMP), which is newly defined in Article 14 of the 
Framework Directive to be equivalent to the competition law concept of dominance: “An 
undertaking shall be deemed to have SMP if, either individually or jointly with others, it 
enjoys a position of dominance, that is to say a position of economic strength affording it the 
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and 
ultimately consumers.”5  
The final stage is that the Commission issued a Recommendation identifying “those 
product and service markets in which ex ante regulation may be warranted.” (CEC, 2003, 
para 2). This sets out criteria for identifying markets where regulation may be warranted: 
high and non-transitory entry barriers, those whose structure does not tend towards effective 
competition within the relevant time horizon, and those where the application of competition 
law would not adequately address the market failure concerned (para. 9). “It is considered 
that markets that are not identified6 in the Recommendation will not warrant ex-ante 
regulation,” (Guidelines, para 29). The Recommendation then defines 18 markets that NRAs 
are required to review. 
 The Guidelines “requires NRAs to ensure that the measures they impose on SMP 
operators under Article 16 of the Framework Directive are justified in relation to the 
objectives set out in Article 8 and are proportionate to the achievement of those objectives.” 
Later, (at para. 118) “the means used to attain a given end should be no more than what is 
appropriate and necessary to achieve that end.” 
 The cumulative effect of these Directives is to limit regulation to those markets where 
competition law would be inadequate, and then further to restrict the scope of regulation to 
the minimum justifiable level. Whereas the American approach is to gradually relax an all-
encompassing ability to regulate, the European approach is to propose the minimum degree 
of regulation that could be justified in a court of law. The British approach started rather 
closer to the American concept in normally requiring network services to hold licences 
(except for some new and small entrants). Each approach reflects the evolutionary history of 
                                                 
5 EU Framework Directive 2002/21/EC, Official Journal, 1L 108/33-49, 24.4.2002 
6 as having SMP 
 9
utility ownership and regulation. The United States had evolved a system of regulation that 
was then enshrined in Acts, Britain had to design a system ab initio, while the European 
Commission had to seek consensus among countries with very different patterns of 
ownership, utility duties, and central government control, starting from the pre-existing EC 
Treaty and its competition law. 
 Despite the limitations that consensus-seeking might suggest, one can argue that this 
approach has attractions for harmonising telecommunications markets, where companies not 
only need to communicate across borders but where mobile (cell-phone) operators also 
frequently operate in many European countries. One can draw a distinction between the 
classic and ‘post-modern’ network utility. In the classic network utility, the network is a 
natural monopoly subject to limited technical progress and supplying a mass service. In the 
‘post-modern’ network utility facilities-based competition is possible, failure of a single 
network may not be critical, innovation is important, and services supplied are useful rather 
than essential. In the first case, regulation is inevitable, while in the second case, competition 
law has potentially strong attractions and should be given maximum scope. Competition law, 
not regulation, should be the default option for post-modern utilities. 
 The interpretation of Significant Market Power, or SMP, in a post-modern utility 
needs to take account of the dynamics of technical progress. The concept of single dominance 
involves balancing a number of considerations, no one of which is likely to be decisive by 
itself. Thus market shares are themselves not conclusive, although there is a presumption that 
SMP is unlikely with a market share of less than 25%, and likely with a market share of more 
than 50%.7 Normally a share of 40% or more would be required, but in addition the analysis 
should allow for market shares that are fluctuating, markets that are emerging and/or rapidly 
growing, and should be suspicious of persistently high market shares. Barriers to entry 
through control of infrastructure, essential facilities, because of economies of scale or scope, 
and exercised by vertical integration, would suggest a greater possibility of exercising SMP. 
 
Mobile telephony 
All of these qualifications to relying on market shares alone apply with considerable force in 
determining whether mobile network operators (MNOs) have SMP in any of the relevant 
markets. Thus in Britain there were four MNOs in 2002, and five in 2003, with subscriber 
market shares that fall close to or below the threshold for dominance of 25%. The markets 
were initially unregulated (although all MNOs had licences), were clearly very dynamic, 
growing at very high rates, and most of the MNOs were not making profits. Nevertheless, 
Oftel monitored the various telecoms markets (both mobile and fixed-line), and in particular 
those markets experiencing SMP. In March 1998, the Director General of 
                                                 
7 The US Department of Justice applies a screen based on the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, based on 
the market shares of all participants (and equal to the sum of the percentage market shares, with 
10,000 representing a single firm). Markets with HHIs above 1,800 attract attention, and this number 
could be reached by one firm with 40% share, and two firms of 10% shares each, all the rest being 
small. 
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Telecommunications (DGT, i.e. the regulator) referred the then two largest MNOs (Cellnet 
and Vodafone) and BT to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission relating to call 
termination charges (MMC, 1999). The DGT considered that the MNOs were able to set the 
termination charges without significant market pressure, that as a result they were excessive, 
and should be regulated to be cost-reflective. Each MNO has an effective monopoly in 
delivering calls to customers on its network, as at present there is no commercially feasible 
alternative way in which different networks can compete to deliver calls to any particular 
mobile customer. In addition, because the calling party pays rather than, as in the United 
States, the receiving party pays, the call recipient has little incentive to choose an MNO who 
offers lower call termination charges.8 The market for mobile call termination is therefore an 
effective monopoly and exhibits SMP. 
The DGT also argued that BT’s retail charges for fixed-to-mobile calls ere not 
adequately restrained by competitive pressure, as BT carried 83% of fixed-to-mobile call 
minutes from residential users and 66% from businesses. As the cost of fixed-to-mobile calls 
was still a modest share of total bills, BT was not under enough competitive pressure to 
moderate these charges, and hence also possessed SMP in the fixed-to-mobile call market. As 
a result, the profit BT was making on fixed-to-mobile calls was far higher than on other 
comparable calls. As BT was subject to price control for other services where it was deemed 
to have SMP, it was natural to propose a price-cap for BT’s fixed-to-mobile calls. The more 
interesting question was whether there should be a separate price cap for fixed-to-mobile 
calls, or whether to include fixed-to-mobile calls in the basket of services subject to an 
overall price cap. The latter arrangement has the attraction that (provided the basket is base-
weighted) the utility has the correct incentives to choose the most efficient or Ramsey pattern 
of prices (Armstrong, Cowan and Vickers, 1994, p81). The MMC rejected placing fixed-to-
mobile calls in the existing price-cap basket, as they were concerned that BT might be 
tempted to favour its then-subsidiary, Cellnet, and instead proposed a separate price-cap on 
BT’s retention (i.e. the profit it made on fixed-to-mobile calls). 
At the time of the 1998 inquiry, Vodafone and Cellnet between them had 72% of total 
mobile subscribers, which had fallen from 100% five years earlier (MMC, 1999, p147). The 
DGT therefore concluded that the two new entrants should be left unregulated (apart from the 
standard licence conditions), and they were not referred to the MMC, and not included in the 
proposed call termination charge price cap. This price cap would run until 2001/02.  
In July 2000, Oftel began a review of competition in mobile termination to see 
whether the markets still experienced SMP. By then the two new entrants had secured half 
the market. Oftel concluded that there had been no technological change making call 
                                                 
8  Some users (particularly businesses) are concerned to choose a network offering lower termination 
charges to those whose calls are valuable to the recipient (friends, customers, etc), and networks 
compete by charging lower on-net (i.e. calls originating and terminating on the same network) than 
off-net calls. Such price discrimination actually provides an incentive to raise off-net termination 
charges as these raise rivals’ costs, and so further reduce competitive pressures to moderate call 
termination charges. 
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termination contestable, and the continuation of calling party pays reduced any competitive 
pressure that might exist on call termination. Oftel therefore concluded that each of the four 
MNOs had SMP in their respective markets for call termination, and proposed a new price 
cap for call termination charges. The MNOs appealed and the DGT referred the case to the 
Competition Commission (the successor to the MMC) in January 2002.9
The case took a year, and spanned the publication of the EC Telecommunications 
Directives. These Directives required Oftel to review the telecommunications market listed in 
the Recommendation. Oftel published its own guidelines in August 2002, although it did not 
publish its Review of mobile wholesale voice call termination markets: EU Market Review 
until 15 May 2003, after the publication of the Competition Commission report (CC, 2003). 
By then there were five MNOs, one of which, called 3, was planning to roll out a 3G network 
later in 2003.10 Oftel’s Review concluded “that each mobile network operator (“MNO”) in 
the UK has significant market power in a separate market for voice call termination on its 
network, and in the case of 3, wholesale 2G voice call termination provided to its subscribers, 
and can be expected to have market power for at least the next three years.” 
 The Competition Commission agreed with Oftel that the MNOs had SMP, that mobile 
call termination charges were excessive, and, as in the earlier inquiry, that the most 
appropriate remedy was a price cap on the call charges. The issue then resolved into how that 
price cap should be set. MNOs offer three services, subscription, associated with owning a 
hand-set, making and receiving calls. It is possible to measure the long-run incremental costs 
(LRIC) of providing each of these services, but pricing at LRIC would not cover the fixed 
and common costs of the mobile network. Even a competitive market would therefore have to 
mark up prices above LRIC if it were to break even. The MNOs argued that the admittedly 
high mark-up over long-run incremental costs of termination was used to subsidise hand-sets, 
which stimulated the development of the market and accelerated penetration. This in turn 
created beneficial network externalities to all callers (fixed as well as mobile), as it increased 
the number of people they could call and hence increased the value of each network. The 
combination of calling party pays (CPP), which facilitated hand-set subsidies and pay-as-you-
go, dramatically increased the rate of market growth compared to the US approach of 
receiving party pays (RPP), so that Mexico decided to switch from RPP to CPP in 1999, and 
then experienced an acceleration in market growth. 
Such network externalities had been recognised in the earlier MMC inquiry and justified 
an additional subsidy financed by call termination. The main issue was how to allocate the fixed 
and common costs (including internalising this network externality). The Competition 
Commission supported Oftel’s recommendation that these costs should be financed by an equi-
proportional mark-up on all LRICs. The MNO’s argued for a Ramsey mark-up, which all parties 
                                                 
9 The author should declare an interest in that he was at the time of writing an advisor to Vodafone in 
its case before the High Court. 
10  Before then, the MNOs were using second generation (‘2G’)  technology, but all five companies 
had secured spectrum in earlier auctions, and were preparing to introduce third-generation or 3G 
packet-switched (always on) technology, with greater bandwidth and data handling capability. 
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accepted would be efficient if applied to all three mark-ups.11 Ramsey mark-ups would be 
inversely proportional to market demand elasticities, and as these were lower for call termination 
than the other services, would justify a higher termination mark-up. Oftel argued that,12 “even if 
termination charges were set at the Ramsey level, there would be no guarantee that MNOs 
would set their (unregulated) retail prices at the Ramsey levels. In Oftel's view the key reason is 
that the retail market for mobile services is not effectively competitive. If the retail market were 
perfectly competitive and if termination charges were regulated at the Ramsey level, it would be 
expected that firms would set Ramsey retail prices. The intuition is that in a perfectly 
competitive market firms are forced by competitive pressure to set prices that maximise 
consumer surplus.” 
The Competition Commission defended equi-proportional mark-up on essentially two 
grounds: that it was not fair to fixed-line callers to have a higher mark-up on mobile call 
termination, the benefits of which would flow back to subsidising mobile use, and that in any 
case the evidence for establishing the relevant demand elasticities was not sufficiently robust 
to justify a departure from equi-proportional mark-ups. The MNOs then appealed to the High 
Court for a Judicial Review. A judicial review of a Competition Commission case is 
essentially a test that the Commission had followed due process and given reasoned 
arguments for its conclusions, and does not as such normally reconsider whether the 
contestants’ arguments were more compelling. Justice Moses delivered his judgement in 
favour of the Competition Commission on 27 June 2003.  
The case is interesting in showing the effect of this competition law approach on 
regulation, but it also raises some important and not properly resolved issues. On the positive 
side, although the case was brought before the Telecommunications Directives came into 
force, Oftel was already conducting its market analyses and basing its case for regulation on 
very similar principles, particularly in defining markets and determining whether they 
suffered from SMP. Second, the idea of confining regulation only to those markets suffering 
from SMP and leaving other markets to competition law has now been accepted. From 25 
July 2003 telecommunications licensing was abolished in the UK (and the rest of the EU) as a 
direct consequence of the new EU communications regime. Licenses will be replaced by 
General Conditions made under the British Communications Bill (which had not then been 
passed into law).13 Third, regulation now has to be justified in relation to the objectives of the 
Directives, proportionate, and no more than that appropriate and necessary to achieve that 
end, as the Guidelines cited above requires. 
                                                 
11 Oftel set out its views in Ramsey Prices and Network Externalities: Dr. Rohlfs’ Analysis, 23 May 
2002: “Ramsey prices, including the implications of externalities, are relevant in theory. But for 
practical reasons they are unlikely to provide a reliable basis for setting regulated charges.” 
12  In “Ramsey pricing – Oftel’s response to letter of 4 July” dated 12/7/2002. 
13  Oftel published a consultation document on continuing licence conditions after 25 July 2003 until 
the new law come into effect at http://www.oftel.gov.uk/publications/licensing/2003/cont0703.htm  
 13
The theoretical disagreements relate to how regulation should be designed to be 
compatible with competition policy.14 Article 13(2) of the EU Access Directive 
(2002/19/EC) requires that “National regulatory authorities shall ensure that any cost 
recovery mechanism or pricing methodology that is mandated serves to promote efficiency 
and sustainable competition and maximise consumer benefits.”  An economist would 
interpret this as requiring, if possible, the regulation to simulate the effects of a competitive 
market. For a lawyer like Justice Moses matters were more complicated: “…the term 
‘maximum economic efficiency’ is itself protean. … The concept involves value judgements 
… As Professor Geroski of the Competition Commission says, at paragraph 175 of his first 
statement, there is no unique definition of economic efficiency and no necessary dichotomy 
between efficiency and the principles of equity which the Commission sought to apply.” 
(Moses, J. 2003, at para 122). 
This argument seems somewhat disingenuous. Competitive markets deliver 
efficiency, not equity or fairness. Equity is better pursued by explicitly designed 
redistributive taxation, and under reasonable assumptions (set out in Diamond and Mirrlees, 
1971), taxation should not distort pre-tax market prices, except for correcting for 
externalities. Under additional and also reasonable assumptions taxes on goods and services 
should be uniform, with redistributive taxes concentrated on income. This optimal form of 
redistributive taxation leaves relative market prices exactly as they would have been under 
competition with no taxes. In practice, it is more effective to redistribute real income through 
the expenditure side of the budget.15 More to the point, the spirit of the Communications 
Directive and, more generally, of achieving consistency between competition policy and 
regulation, is that regulation should only be employed where markets do not deliver 
competitive outcomes. Where regulation is required it should attempt to produce the result 
that markets would have delivered if they had been competitive.   
To return to mobile call termination, economic principles provide useful guidance for 
setting the price cap to simulate the effect of a competitive market. First, the efficient way of 
recovering fixed and common costs is Ramsey pricing for all the various services, in which 
the mark-up over LRIC is inversely proportional to market demand elasticities. Second, in a 
market where subscribers must choose between different suppliers to purchase the whole 
range of bundled services, effective competition in all service markets would force the 
suppliers to charge Ramsey prices for each service offered (i.e. subscription, making and 
receiving calls). Third, termination is a bottleneck service and thus not subject to the same 
competitive pressures as subscriptions and calling. Mobile operators can raise termination 
charges to fixed operators who are subject to regulation and unable to exercise countervailing 
                                                 
14  There are other significant disputes to do with matters of fact, of which the most important is the 
size of the fixed and common costs, which in turn relates to the extent of economies of scale in mobile 
networks. 
15  Subsidising goods consumed by the poor normally leads to a larger subsidy to the rich, who buy 
more of the good, whereas equal lump-sum transfers (in kind or in cash) avoid this drawback. 
 14
power, and will have incentives to do so if the surpluses above cost thereby generated can be 
applied to fund competitive activities against other mobile operators.  
Mobile operators also have incentives to raise charges to each other, since this 
disadvantages callers from other networks and encourages them to switch networks to the 
MNO charging the higher termination fee. This tends to over-reward mark-ups on 
termination relative to the efficient level. As a result, competitive forces will not ensure that 
MNOs set termination mark-ups to either fixed or mobile operators at Ramsey levels without 
regulation. Finally, new subscribers confer a network externality on existing mobile and fixed 
line subscribers, which they will undervalue in making the subscription decision. There is 
therefore a case for subsidising subscription relative to the incremental cost, and this 
adjustment forms part of the identification of appropriate Ramsey mark-ups. 
If the remaining mobile markets are competitive, and if call termination charges are 
regulated at the Ramsey level, then all mark-ups would be set efficiently as though all 
services were competitive. Oftel disputed that the retail market for mobile services was 
competitive in its submission to the Competition Commission, but also accepted in its Market 
Review that the retail market was effectively competitive, in the sense that no MNO has 
SMP. That does not mean that the market corresponds exactly to the textbook definition of 
perfectly competitive (which, inter alia, requires constant or decreasing returns to scale, ruled 
out by the very need to recover fixed and common costs by a mark-up). It does mean that 
there are good reasons for not regulating that market. 
This raises an important philosophical point. A welfare economist might argue that 
given one instrument (the mark-up in the regulated market), and one objective (maximise 
social welfare subject to private ownership, i.e. a profit constraint), the mark-up should take 
into account all market failures, including possibly imperfect competition in the mobile retail 
market. The whole thrust of the Communications Directives is that regulation cannot be 
justified if markets are deemed effectively competitive. That would seem to imply that 
regulators should not be able to leverage their authority to regulate some markets into other 
markets that are not subject to regulation (because they do not exhibit SMP). As regulation is 
costly (particularly in dynamic markets), it is only justified where there is no suitable 
competition law remedy. Competition law does not aim to make all markets perfectly 
competitive by assuming that it is costless to intervene, but leveraging regulation into other 
markets to improve their workings would seem to come very close to trying to achieve 
efficiency in these other markets which are almost, but not quite, competitive. 
Another way of putting the same point is that the key principle of British regulation of 
network utilities is that competition should be encouraged where possible, and where natural 
monopoly precludes this, regulation should mimic the effect of competition. Price-cap 
regulation was developed precisely for this reason. Once it is accepted that Ramsey pricing 
would in fact mimic the workings of competitive markets for bundled services, it would 
follow that Ramsey pricing is appropriate (indeed, required) for the service (termination) that 
requires regulation. The principle has the additional advantage that as competition develops 
in the unregulated markets (through the market maturing, under competition from new 
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services such as 3G, or as a result of competition policy), there is no need to re-adjust the 
form of regulation in the call termination market. 
 
Assessment on regulation and competition policy in telecoms 
The Communications Directives have had a considerable impact on the form of telecoms 
regulation in Britain by ending the licence regime, and restricting the scope of regulation to 
markets suffering from Significant Market Power, and then only where regulation is required 
to achieve efficiency and sustainable competition. The evidence from telecoms liberalisation 
is that competition is indeed the key determinant of performance (Newbery, 2003) and so it 
seems natural to ensure that regulation does not impede the workings of otherwise 
competitive markets. The next question is whether the same approach would work as well for 
other network utilities. The most challenging such utility is the electricity supply industry, 
where, in contrast to telecoms, liberalisation is viewed with increasing scepticism in Europe 
and North America. 
 
Electricity regulation and competition policy   
Electricity markets differ in one obvious way from telecoms markets. Telephone users wish 
to speak to a particular person, whereas electrons are anonymous and are equally attractive 
from any source. This distinction makes vertical integration much less important.16 The fact 
that economies of scope between generation, transmission and distribution appear small 
suggests that it is desirable to separate the potentially competitive generation and supply (or 
retailing) functions from the natural monopoly high and lower tension networks. These 
networks should then be regulated The updated Energy Directive (2003/54/EC), which came 
into effect in August 2003, requires member states to set up national regulatory authorities, 
and to impose regulated Third Party Access on transmission and distribution. The traces of 
earlier objections from some member states remain in that the regulator can either set tariffs 
ex ante or publish the methodology under which they can be set. Nevertheless, the principle 
that charges for using the networks should be regulated has now been widely accepted. The 
relevant question is whether the potentially competitive segments of generation and supply 
should be dealt with under normal competition law, as in many countries, subject presumably 
to tests of significant market power, or whether they should be subject to stronger regulatory 
controls. 
Where the generation market is dominated by an incumbent, as in France (where the 
state-owned EdF controls about 95% of generation), or in Belgium (where the private 
company Electrabel has a similar share), it is clearly easy to demonstrate SMP. Tacit 
regulation, in which the threat of an investigation for abuse of market power, may then be 
sufficient. Many electricity markets are, however, characterised by the largest generator 
having less than 40% of the market, while still remaining fairly concentrated. The concept of 
                                                 
16  There is a similar distinction between the circuit-switched networks used for voice telephone, 
where end-to-end continuous real-time connectivity is required for service quality, and packet-
switched networks for data and internet, where vertical integration is no longer so valuable. 
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single dominance is then not sufficient, and something more inclusive is required. Under 
Article 82, a dominant position can be held by one or more undertakings (‘collective 
dominance’). The jurisprudence on establishing collective dominance is still evolving, but it 
is now accepted that “a dominant position may be held by two or more economic entities 
which are legally and economically independent of each other.” (Guidelines, 3.1.2.1). 
The Court of First Instance gives as an example of conditions conducive to collective 
dominance: “the relationship of interdependence existing between the parties to a tight 
oligopoly within which, in a market with the appropriate characteristics, in particular in terms 
of market concentration, transparency and product homogeneity, those parties are in a 
position to anticipate one another’s behaviour and are therefore strongly encouraged to align 
their conduct in the market, in particular in such a way as to maximise their joint profits by 
restricting production with a view to increasing prices.” (Case T102/96, Gencor v 
Commission [1999] ECR II-753). 
 This list of conditions conducive to collective dominance maps almost exactly on to 
the characteristics of wholesale electricity markets. Consider as the leading example the 
English Electricity Pool, set up as the wholesale market for England and Wales at the time of 
restructuring and privatisation in 1989/90. The Pool continued until it was replaced by the 
New Electricity Trading Arrangements in 2001. The Pool was a compulsory, day-ahead, last-
price auction in which generators had firm rights to transmission but no firm obligations to 
generate. Generators submitted bids the day before and the System Marginal Price (SMP) was 
set each half hour as the bid price of the most expensive unconstrained generation unit called on 
to operate. Unconstrained generators were all paid the same SMP plus a capacity payment, 
making up the Pool Purchase Price, PPP. Generators available but not dispatched also received 
the capacity payments, while constrained generators received their bid price, if they were 
required to generate within an import-constrained zone and bid above the SMP, or their lost 
profit (SMP less bid price) if they were in an export-constrained zone. The prices for each half-
hour were published by 5pm the day before so that consumers could adjust any consumption 
decisions in the light of these prices. 
 The Pool prices were overlaid with financial contracts to reduce risk. The typical 
contract was a two-sided Contract for Differences (CfD), with a strike price s for a volume M 
MWh of electricity. If the Pool price were p in that time period, the buyer paid p per unit to the 
Pool and (s-p)M to the company issuing the contract, thus effectively ensuring delivery of the 
contracted quantity of electricity at the strike price. The generator similarly received p per unit 
dispatched from the Pool, but was assured of receiving in total the strike price per unit 
contracted. It is readily proved that the best bid for a fully contracted generator is the marginal 
cost of generation, m. The generator would receive (s-m)M total profit if he generated, and a 
larger amount, (s-p)M, if p < m and he were not called to generate. 
 At privatisation, the Central Electricity Generating Board of England and Wales had 
been unbundled into a separate transmission company, National Grid, two fossil-fuel 
generating companies, National Power and PowerGen, and a nuclear generating company, 
Nuclear Electric, which remained in public ownership until 1996. The two fossil generating 
companies set the price of electricity in the Pool over 95% of the time in the first four years, 
 17
but as they had been sold almost fully contracted, they had little incentive to raise prices until 
they came to renegotiate the contracts over the next three years. As the original contracts 
expired and had to be renegotiated, so they raised the prices relative to the rapidly declining 
fuel prices.  
 Fig. 1 shows the evolution of the wholesale electricity price. The cost of generating by 
coal and gas are also shown, so the margin of the price over the short-run avoidable fuel cost 
is readily seen. The prices are yearly moving averages of the half-hourly pool prices or the 
quarterly fuel prices, and are deflated by the Retail Price Index to the 2001 price level. The 
line with diamonds gives the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI), defined as the sum of the 
squared percentage shares of coal-fired plant capacity (which set the price most of the time 
until 1999) owned by different companies, read on the RHS scale. An HHI of 5,000 
represents a symmetric duopoly, and the initial concentration was somewhat higher than this 
as National Power was 50% larger than PowerGen. 
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Fig. 1 Evolution of the wholesale electricity market in England and Wales 
 
 The half-hourly and daily prices were dramatically more volatile than these annual 
average figures, and the numerous price spikes attracted particular attention. The early Pool 
inquiries by the Director General of Electricity Supply, the electricity regulator, found that the 
price-cost margin was justified (Offer, 1992), but by 1994, it was clear that the continuing fall in 
coal prices was not leading to a comparable fall in the Pool price. The subsequent inquiry 
concluded with a price cap on the annual average Pool price, to be ended by the sale of 6,000 
GW of plant, as shown. That sale lowered concentration (from an HHI of just under 5,000 to just 
under 3,500), but did nothing to reduce the price-cost margin. Part of the explanation was that 
the plant had been sold under a leasing arrangement to the buyer, who had to pay £6/MWh for 
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each unit sold. The defence of this was partly one of sharing risk (as the payment is only made 
when the plant successfully sells electricity) and partly to pay for the sulphur credits handed over 
with the stations, but had the effect of raising rivals’ costs, encouraging them to support a high 
bid-price strategy in the Pool. 
 The Electricity Pool up to mid-1998 would seem to satisfy most of the criteria for 
collective dominance that would be likely to lead to tacit collusion. The market was 
concentrated (HHI above 3,000) and transparent (all prices were published the day ahead, and 
anyone could subscribe to Pool data giving the bids of each participant for each day). It was 
mature (with very low rates of growth); the product, electricity, was homogenous, produced by 
firms with similar or even identical plant and hence very similar cost structures. These costs 
were also transparent (mainly fuel costs whose prices were published). The demand elasticity 
was very low (even for those large customers who faced the Pool price), while a large fraction of 
electricity was sold at prices that were kept constant over periods of a year, despite huge 
variations in half-hourly prices.17 The only criteria for likely collective dominance that the Pool 
failed to satisfy was that barriers to entry were low, and indeed entry was rapid. However, entry 
was by gas-fired plant running on base-load with contracts to distribution companies, and mostly 
bid a zero price into the Pool. They therefore did not participate in price setting. Over time the 
increase in capacity would undermine the prospects for tacit collusion, but the impact was 
gradual and not noticeable for the first seven years. 
 The other evidence to examine for tacit collusion is whether the prices remain high even 
when costs fall, and that was certainly the case. Fortunately, the extraordinary wealth of data 
about bidding behaviour in the Pool makes it possible to test for tacit collusion directly. 
Sweeting (2001) does this using bid data from each firm to see whether their bids are best 
responses to the bids of other firms. Fig. 1 divides up the time since privatisation into the 
relevant periods. During the first, from 1990-94, the duopolists offered to supply more at each 
price than would have been individually profit maximising, so if they were tacitly colluding it 
was to drive the prices lower, not higher. This is consistent both with the high initial contract 
coverage, and of tacit regulation. The duopolists might have reasoned that the exercise of market 
power would attract adverse regulatory activity, as it finally did in 1994. The two years of price 
control demonstrated the considerable ability of the companies to meet the price cap to within 
1% despite a huge price spike caused by the loss of a nuclear station at the time the French 
decided to import 2,000 MW instead of, as normal, exporting 2,000MW to England. 
 The period following the end of the price cap until 1998 was a period in which each of 
the three firms appeared to be individually profit maximising, without any need for collusion 
(given their considerable individual market power). Finally, the last period for which Sweeting 
had data covers the period of rapid sales of generation plant by the incumbents, as they traded 
horizontal market power for permission (granted by the relevant Government minister) to 
                                                 
17  Customers holding CfDs nevertheless had an incentive to respond to the Pool price, as the contract 
were financial and would involve payments regardless of actual consumption. Patrick and Wolak 
(1999) find very low price-elasticities (on average –0.025) even for large customers facing Pool 
prices. 
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vertically integrate into supply. During this period concentration fell rapidly, spare capacity 
increased, and bidding behaviour was consistent with tacit collusion to reduce supply at each 
level of price. There was a strong motive for this, as the generators wished to sell their plant for 
the highest price, and to do that they needed to convince prospective buyers that margins would 
remain high despite the excess capacity and falling market concentration. Once the sales had 
been made, the new owners, less familiar with the previous market game, bid more aggressively 
and competitively, thus undermining collusion and causing the price-cost margin to collapse. 
 
Addressing cases of collective dominance 
Electricity wholesale markets thus exhibit characteristics that are likely to support collective 
dominance, and specifically allow prices to remain well above competitive levels, even when the 
market does not appear to be particularly concentrated. In some cases (1996-8 in Britain) high 
price-cost margins can be sustained even without tacit collusion, given the technical 
characteristics of electricity. These include the very low demand elasticity, the inability to store 
electricity, and the effect of transmission constraints in fragmenting the market. If the capacity is 
not instantly available to deliver into a constrained region, then the generators operating in that 
region can demand extremely high prices. Even relatively unconcentrated markets can exhibit 
collective dominance, as the English Pool demonstrated for a brief period after 1998. 
 Competition authorities ought therefore to be able to establish collective dominance for 
many electricity markets. On the Telecommunications Directive model, it would then be open to 
argue that regulation were required to address the problem, if there were no better solution. The 
obvious competition policy remedy would be to require companies to divest generation capacity 
in order to reduce market concentration. There are difficulties with this structural solution, and 
attractions in retaining licence conditions for generation and supply. The obvious difficulty with 
structural remedies is that the burden of proof must be set reasonably high, if competition law is 
not to chill the very driving force of competition, which is the pursuit of profit. It is one thing to 
deny a merger that might increase concentration to the point that there were real concerns about 
future collective dominance, and quite another to move in the opposite direction, and argue that 
an existing industrial structure is suddenly inappropriate. There is good evidence that on average 
mergers destroy total shareholder value, and since they rarely increase competition, that must 
mean that they typically reduce social value. The burden of proof is then on the merging 
partners to demonstrate otherwise. In the present case, the burden of proof would lie squarely 
with the competition authorities, and might be difficult to establish. 
 The main problem of establishing an abuse of a collectively dominant position is to 
define the counterfactual of normally competitive behaviour. In electricity, variable costs are 
only half the average cost, the balance being the return to the very substantial fixed capital, as 
well as the fixed operating costs. A competitive market would need very high prices as the 
margin of spare capacity reduced, to compensate for prices being close to variable costs when 
capacity were adequate. Some commentators have argued that there are severe market failures 
on the demand side, in that final consumers cannot collectively exhibit their willingness to pay 
for the right degree of risk of loss of load (Stoft, 2002). Competitive wholesale markets may 
therefore under-provide security of supply without additional institutional requirements. The 
 20
English Pool had a capacity payment to encourage adequate reserves, but that was criticised for 
distorting the market (Offer, 1998). The initial proposals for the US Standard Market Design 
(for electricity markets) required Load Serving Entities to contract up to four years ahead for 
adequate capacity (i.e. enough for peak demand plus the specified reserve margin). 
 Large electricity generating companies argue that market power provides the ability to 
finance and hold adequate reserve margins, and leads to less price volatility and hence more 
politically sustainable outcomes than a market as fragmented, competitive and un-remunerative 
as the British market after 2000. There the combination of initially excess capacity and fierce 
competition caused the bankruptcy of a number of generators. The largest single generating 
company, British Energy, that holds all the privately owned nuclear plant had to be bailed out by 
the Government to prevent a similar fate. In response, generators have withdrawn capacity, 
causing concerns that there would be power shortages in Winter 2003/4. The reserve margin fell 
from over 32% to under 17% within a very short space of time, although the forward prices then 
induced mothballed plant to be returned to service and no shortages occurred (Roques, Newbery 
and Nuttall, 2005). On this view, too much competition is undesirable, and market power is 
required to deliver secure supply. 
 There are further problems, for if prices are above variable costs, the question is over 
what time period the profits should be averaged to determine whether average prices are above 
average total costs. Plant lasts 30 or more years, so a run of a few years of low prices might 
require rather high prices for an extended period to compensate. The generators under 
investigation could also argue that if there were a short-run problem of high prices, free entry 
would correct the problem, as the market is contestable. 
 There are other obvious problems with the competition policy route to creating workably 
competitive electricity markets. Where the industry was initially in public ownership, it was 
presumably open to the Government to restructure to increase the number of competing 
generation companies. If anything, most Continental governments moved in the opposite 
direction, consolidating previously separate companies to create ‘national champions’, as in 
Spain, and as was proposed for the Netherlands (but fortunately resisted). Where generation 
companies were privately owned, as in Germany, there was little or no resistance to proposed 
mergers that rapidly concentrated the European electricity industry (Codognet et. al., 2002). 
 The contrast with the United States is also instructive. European countries lacked the 
duties and powers available to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, FERC, under the 
1935 Federal Power Act. FERC has a statutory obligation to ensure that wholesale prices are 
“just and reasonable”. If an electric utility wishes to sell at market-determined wholesale prices, 
this will be allowed providing “the seller (and each of its affiliates) does not have, or has 
adequately mitigated, market power in generation and transmission and cannot erect other 
barriers to entry.”18 Even then, the authority to sell at market-determined prices can be 
withdrawn and replaced by regulated prices if there is “any change in status that would reflect a 
                                                 
     18 Heartland Energy Services, Inc, 68 FERC • 61,223, at 62,060 (1994), cited by Bogorad and Penn 
(2001). 
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departure from the characteristics the Commission has relied upon in approving market-based 
pricing.”19
 FERC therefore assumes that market pricing is “just and reasonable” so long as it is 
competitive. The reason for its concern to ensure that prices remain competitive is that any 
FERC-approved form of pricing greatly restricts the competition authorities from intervening. 
At the same time, existing antitrust laws are relatively powerless to enforce competitive 
outcomes in the energy industry as “the antitrust laws do not outlaw the mere possession of 
monopoly power that is the result of skill, accident, or a previous regulatory regime. ... Antitrust 
remedies are thus not well-suited to address problems of market power in the electric power 
industry that result from existing high levels of concentration in generation.” (DOE, 2000, cited 
by Bogorad and Penn, 2001). This last point is particularly telling, and suggests that structural 
remedies may be difficult to secure. 
 If competition policy lacks the power to restructure (except in egregious cases of abuse), 
the next recourse would seem to be a regulatory solution. Britain provides an example, where 
the Director General imposed a price cap on wholesale prices until the companies divested some 
plant to improve competitiveness. Price caps on markets where prices are supposed to be 
determined by supply and demand only work if there is substantial market power, and the ability 
to moderate the supply price in the face of effectively a perfectly elastic demand schedule. 
However, the Californian electricity debacle of 1999-2000 demonstrates that poorly designed 
price caps can make matters far worse when there is genuine shortage combined with market 
power (Joskow and Kahn, 2002; Wolak, 2003). There are also problems where trading takes 
place in multiple markets (e.g. bilateral, OTC and balancing markets as well as power 
exchanges), and where the power exchange only handles a few percent of total production. 
Capping one market when there are uncapped close substitutes is likely to have perverse effects. 
The English Pool price cap applied to the annual average price, so some of these problems were 
avoided, and the fact that all electricity had to be traded through the Pool made the prices capped 
representative, avoiding the bypass problem. Regulators, mindful of the Californian lessons and 
the limited coverage of electricity wholesale markets in most countries, are likely to be wary of 
simple price caps.  
 The Latin approach to market power is to require bids into wholesale markets to be cost-
justified (i.e. subject to audit), and to be maintained for lengthy periods (possibly indexed to 
relevant fuel prices). That is the approach followed in Chile, where generation is relatively 
concentrated (Bitran and Serra, 1998; Heller and McCubbins, 1996). System operators in 
some US power pools reserve the right to substitute cost-based bids for market bids if the 
latter lead to an inefficient dispatch, or clear signs of market power. There are several 
problem with this approach. The market design has to find a method of paying for, and 
charging consumers for, capacity. The resulting price formation rapidly becomes a regulatory 
artefact rather than a competitive market, with the players optimising against the regulatory 
price rather than competing to deliver best value. In concentrated markets the results may be 
                                                 
     19 Heartland 68 FERC at 62,066, cited as above. 
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less bad than unregulated price formation, although the latter might at least attract entry with 
the prospect of eventually reducing concentration. 
 A preferable alternative might be to require that generators be willing to offer 
contracts at prices related to the average cost of new entrants. That has the attraction of 
leaving the spot market to reflect supply and demand, while encouraging consumers to seek 
contracts where they are more attractive than relying on the spot market (i.e. when the spot 
market has prices higher than the entry price). The higher the degree of contract cover 
demanded, the less the incentive of the generators to exercise market power in the spot 
market.  Wolak (2001) has suggested this as a remedy for market power in California. 
 The other alternative is to retain the licenses that the Telecommunications Directives 
abolished, recognising that electricity differs in important ways from telecoms. License 
conditions can require detailed operating information to be supplied to the regulator for better 
market surveillance, and can also impose additional restraints. Thus British generators above 
a certain size were required to offer for sale plant that would otherwise be scrapped, to ensure 
that the scrapping was not used to reduce capacity to increase prices above the competitive 
level. Grid codes in some countries specify rules for proper market behaviour and are clearly 
important. They may be an adequate substitute for licenses, although much depends on the 
institutional arrangements for modifying and enforcing them.20
 Licenses can be used to prevent companies vertically integrating or having interests in 
related activities (such as transmission or distribution for generation companies), and to 
include more restrictive interpretations of market abuse than normal competition legislation. 
Again, Britain provides an interesting and salutary example. Fig. 1 shows that although 
market concentration was falling quite rapidly by 1999, the price-cost margin remained high. 
In May 1999 Ofgem (the gas and electricity regulatory agency) published a decision 
document about price spikes in the Pool during winter 1998/99, warning that it would 
continue to monitor prices. In July 1999 Ofgem investigated the high prices at the beginning 
of that month. Ofgem was concerned about the limited competition in price setting despite 
the increase in the number of generators selling through the Pool (from 8 in 1990 to 38 in 
1999). The gas-fired plant of the new entrant Independent Power Producers did not compete 
at the margin and only rarely set prices (3 percent of the time in 1998/99). Three companies 
(National Power, PowerGen and Eastern) set Pool price 86 percent of the time in 1998/99. 
Ofgem expected the recent divestments to increase competition in price setting, but remained 
concerned about the ability of certain generators to influence the price setting mechanism 
(Ofgem, 1999). 
 In October 1999 Ofgem concluded that a Market Abuse Licence Condition (MALC), 
better known as the “good behaviour condition”, needed to be introduced into the licenses of 
                                                 
20  The English Pooling and Settlement Agreement is a case in point, as it was a multilateral contract 
that could only be changed by mutual agreement, and over which the regulator had limited powers. It 
proved so difficult to adapt that it was eventually abolished by primary legislation which also replaced 
the Pool with the New Electricity Trading Arrangements. The new Balancing and Systems Code has a 
properly designed procedure for making modifications. 
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the seven generators most likely to have market power. This provided that “The Licensee 
shall not engage in conduct, whether alone or with one or more other undertakings, which 
amounts to an abuse of a position of substantial market power in the determination of 
wholesale prices for electricity under the relevant trading arrangements.” Possible examples 
of such abuse would be price bidding strategies, capacity withholding, manipulation of 
complex market rules and using the influence of contractual positions. 
To minimise regulatory uncertainty about the operation of the condition, Ofgem 
issued Guidelines about its interpretation. These provided that a Licensee will be regarded as 
having a position of substantial market power if it has the ability to bring about, 
independently of any changes in market demand or cost conditions, a substantial change 
(over £30 million) in wholesale electricity prices. Substantial changes in price might refer to 
a few very large effects or a series of lesser ones. For example, it would include a change of 5 
per cent for more than 30 days (1440 half hours), or 15 per cent over 10 days (480 half hours) 
or 45 per cent over 160 half hours (3 1/3 days), all within a one year period (Ofgem, 2000a). 
It is worth noting that the required increase in prices would amount to about one-third of one 
per cent of turnover in the wholesale electricity market. 
 After a lengthy discussion process lasting until April 2000, five generators consented 
to the condition: Magnox Electric, TXU Europe (formerly Eastern, the purchaser of the 1996 
divested coal-fired plant), Edison Mission Energy, National Power/Innogy and PowerGen. 
Two generators (AES and British Energy) did not consent, and Ofgem referred them to the 
Competition Commission in May. Ofgem argued that other possible remedies and 
developments (further divestment or revised generation market structure, modification of 
Pool and NETA rules, the introduction of NETA itself, the Competition Act 1998 and 
Financial Services Regulation) would not suffice to prevent such abuse. This was because of 
the specific conditions of electricity: the need to match demand and supply instantaneously, 
the non-storability of electricity and the limited demand side response.  
 Shortly afterwards, Ofgem carried out its first investigation under the market abuse 
condition, in the licence of Edison First Power (Ofgem, 2000b). The company had withdrawn 
480MW of capacity from the system. Ofgem concluded that the company had substantial 
market power, which it had exploited to the detriment of consumers. Specifically, the 
continued withdrawal of capacity was not justified on the basis of avoiding losses, and had 
materially increased prices in the Pool and the forwards markets. This was to the detriment of 
over 200 large customers purchasing electricity on Pool-related terms, and other respondents 
were harmed by the increase in Pool Uplift. Because the company announced that it would 
return the capacity to the system, Ofgem took no further action.  
 The Competition Commission published its decision in December 2000 and rejected 
Ofgem’s requirement that AES and British Energy’s licences be modified to include the 
MALC (CC, 2001). The Competition Commission was critical of Ofgem, noting that it did 
not define the relevant market and did not demonstrate that it would be profitable for either 
company to attempt to exercise market power by withdrawing capacity. AES had a long-term 
contract with TXU that made reducing output unprofitable, while 90 per cent of British 
Energy’s potential output came from inflexible base-load nuclear power plant. The 
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Competition Commission considered that a condition prohibiting abuse of market power 
“would cause uncertainty, because of the difficulty of distinguishing between abusive and 
acceptable conduct, and would risk deterring normal competitive behaviour.” (CC 2001, 
1.12).  “We are mindful of the disadvantages of a broad, effects-based prohibition … such a 
prohibition would not be suitable for dealing with manipulation of market rules.” (para 1.18). 
“We see manipulation of the market as conduct for which a sufficient remedy would in 
principle be the modification of the market rules or mechanisms.” (para 1.13). 
 
Assessment of regulatory policy in electricity 
There is no doubt that a specialist energy regulatory authority is valuable in dealing with the 
natural monopoly networks, as the new EU Energy Directive recognises. The issue is whether 
generation and supply should also be regulated or whether normal competition law is 
adequate. The AES and British Energy case is instructive. The case required a time extension 
as the Competition Commission found it very difficult to understand the complexities of the 
wholesale electricity market, even though Ofgem supplied a large amount of explanatory 
material. Electricity market surveillance is a critical element in ensuring that market 
participants do not abuse positions of collective dominance, and such surveillance requires 
timely information that is commercially sensitive and not normally made available without a 
licence (or grid code) condition making it a condition of operation. Market surveillance needs 
to be a continuing activity if market participants are to be assured of non-abusive behaviour, 
and it needs to be analytically well-founded if market rules found wanting are to be 
improved. 
All this suggests that the energy regulatory authority should take on the task of market 
surveillance, and should be adequately empowered to monitor the relevant markets, and make 
rule changes. Competition authorities are likely to be far less well-equipped to do this, and 
will be far slower to act. The Californian electricity industry went from crisis to claimed 
bankruptcy in the space of a few weeks, while FERC made regulatory decisions that, 
according to an expert witness “allowed a manageable problem to develop into an economic 
disaster” (Wolak, 2003). Whether regulators need additional powers in addition to being able 
to make rule changes will depend on market circumstances. Britain suggests that the ability to 
impose conditions (price caps, cost-based contracting or even cost-based bidding) might be a 
useful lever to achieve market restructuring, although in the hands of a less trusted regulator 
might discourage private investment in generation, which might be far worse than accepting 
some market abuse. 
 
Conclusions 
Post-modern utilities like telecoms, in which facilities-based competition is possible, lend 
themselves to the approach laid out in the EU Telecommunications Directives. Regulators 
must first conduct market reviews to determine whether markets are effectively competitive 
or suffer from Significant Market Power (SMP). Only in the latter case is ex ante regulation 
warranted, and then only if it is necessary, justified and proportionate. Electricity does not fit 
comfortably into this approach, in part because the wholesale market is more likely to suffer 
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from collective dominance than the single firm dominance that allows for an easier 
determination of SMP. Licence conditions are no longer needed under the 
Telecommunications Directives, but appear to retain advantages for electricity, where 
information and continuing market surveillance are desirable, and where it may be necessary 
to modify market rules in a timely and well-informed manner.  
Competition policy remedies are likely to be too slow in electricity, where rapid, 
knowledgeable and intelligent actions may be necessary to avoid very costly outcomes. That 
said, one should not underestimate the difficulty of ensuring that wholesale electricity 
markets work well, in delivering competitive outcomes that are sustainable in the long run. 
FERC, with extensive powers under the 1935 Federal Power Act, failed to avoid the 
Californian crisis, and Ofgem’s Market Abuse Licence Condition was found unsuitable for at 
least some of its target clients. The fall in concentration coming after excess entry induced by 
the earlier exercise of market power caused a collapse in British wholesale electricity prices 
and a subsequent withdrawal of plant that halved the reserve margin and has caused concern 
for supply adequacy in the winter months. All this suggests that ensuring workable 
competition in electricity supply continues to remain a challenge to regulators and 
competition authorities. 
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